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WOMEN ACCUSED OF HOMICIDE: THE USE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE EFFECT OF BATTERING
ON WOMEN-A TRIAL JUDGE'S PERSPECTIVE.
Steven I. Plattt
I. INTRODUCTION
During my career as a circuit court judge, I have presided over
many cases in which abused women were accused of killing their
abusers.' In this Commentary, I plan to discuss two of those cases.
In both cases, the deceased was killed in a manner and under such
circumstances that the State's Attorney in my jurisdiction, Alexander
Williams, Jr.,2 decided to prosecute the defendants for first-degree
premeditated murder and all lesser degrees of homicide legally in-
cluded in that charge. Mr. Williams was very aware of and sensitive
to the dynamics of domestic violence during that time period.
I was a district court judge from August 1986 to May 1990, and
I have been a circuit court judge since May 1990. I have lost count
of the vast number of criminal and civil domestic-violence-protective-
t I am a circuit court judge for the Seventh Judicial Circuit of Maryland, sitting
in Prince George's County. This Commentary is a compilation of my experience
and observations on the use of expert testimony on the effect of battering on
women in spousal abuse cases.
I wish to acknowledge the following members of my staff:
(1) Sarah N. Qureshi, my law clerk, for her assistance in editing this
Commentary;
(2) Martha Folea, my administrative assistant, for her typing and encour-
agement;
(3) Barbara Flynn, my courtroom clerk, who is always my conscience in the
courtroom; and
(4) Debbie Callahan, for encouraging me to write this Commentary and to
participate in the Women Judges' Fund for Justice Roundtable Discussion
Conference, out of which this Commentary was born.
Several other people whose help was invaluable are acknowledged in the
body and footnotes of this Commentary.
1. Although I have presided over three of these cases, I will only discuss two of
them in this Commentary. The third case involved no expert testimony because
the defendant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter after rulings on pre-
trial motions. That case does not, therefore, merit description in this context.
The only one of the cases over which I presided that was subject to appellate
review was State of Maryland v. Annabel E. Elias, No. 1705, slip op. (Md.
App. Aug. 2, 1994) (affirming the conviction of Ms. Elias for second degree
murder).
2. Alexander Williams, Jr. is now a United States District Court Judge.
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order cases that I have presided over in which individuals with
extensive histories of abusive behavior were charged with felonious
and/or severe misdemeanor assaults and batteries on their co-habi-
tants. I am sure, however, that the number exceeds two hundred
throughout my entire judicial career to date.3
II. PERSPECTIVE
In this section, I will recount the pertinent facts and dispositions
of the two cases that were tried before me in which abused women
were accused of killing their abusers in a homicidal manner. To
allow readers of this Commentary to formulate their own informed
judgments about the biases that may have contributed to the conclu-
sions that I reached while presiding over these cases, I will explain
the premise for this Commentary.
My experience is purely anecdotal, but it is extensive. My con-
clusions result from reflecting on my experiences and discussing them
with others whose perspective may have been different but who
played primary roles in those courtroom experiences. I then supple-
mented those thoughts with perspectives of other nationally recruited
experts 4 who participated in a Roundtable Discussion Conference
3. During my five years on the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, I have
presided over two cases in which men with an extensive history of abusing
their female victims ultimately killed them and were also charged with first
degree premeditated murder and all lesser included degrees of homicide. In
this Commentary, however, I plan to discuss two cases in which female victims
ultimately killed their male (husband) abusers.
4. The "experts" to whom I respectfully refer are: Hon. LaDoris Cordell, Chair,
Project Planning Committee; Mary Ann Dutton, Ph.D., Project Editor and
Writer, expert witness, legal lecturer, author of numerous articles on battered
women; Mary Morgan, Esq., moderator, former clinical law professor, Do-
mestic Violence Project; Hon. Margarita Bernal, retired, municipal court
magistrate judge, Tucson, Arizona, instructor of Domestic Violence class,
National Judicial College; Julie Blackman, Ph.D., expert social psychologist
witness; Sarah Buel, Esq., survivor of domestic violence, prosecutor, speaker,
writer; Janet Carter, Project Director, Domestic Violence Project, Assistant
Director, Family Violence Prevention Fund; Rolanda Pierre Dixon, Esq.,
prosecutor, Santa Clara County, California; David Dorsey, Esq., writer of
paper on battered women and the duress defense, formerly an attorney with
National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women; Thea DuBow,
service provider, speaker, domestic violence survivor, formerly imprisoned;
Anne Ganley, Ph.D., psychologist, works with batterers, expert on domestic
violence, Planning Committee member; Hon. Kathy Gearin, Chair, WJFJ
Project Development Committee, Planning Committee member; Hon. Cindy
Lederman, Administrative Judge, Domestic Violence Department, Dade County,
Florida; Jayne Lee, Esq., diversity expert; Hon. Stephen M. McNamee, federal
judge and former United States Attorney, experience with domestic violence
and sexual assault cases; Holly Maguigan, Esq., former defense attorney,
[Vol. 25
19951 Expert Testimony and Domestic Abuse
under the auspices of the Women Judges' Fund for Justice, the
United States Department of Justice and the State Justice Institute.
The conference was held in Washington, D.C., on April 29 and 30,
1995. These perspectives were expressed in working papers and were
presented orally at the Conference.
I have also discussed my conclusions with certain colleagues,5
after ascertaining the nature and extent of their experiences in ar-
guably analogous cases, to determine whether any conclusions that
they have reached regarding these issues were different than mine
and, if so, to what extent. Based on those discussions, I discern no
significant difference between either the experiences themselves or
the conclusions reached by those judicial colleagues whose counsel I
sought and received for this Commentary.
I also wish to place an additional caveat on my opinions about
the impact of expert testimony on the effect of battering on women
accused in criminal cases. I have not attempted to set forth in detail
the cases and statutes that governed my decisions on evidentiary
issues and jury instructions in these cases. These cases and statutes
establish the parameters of the fact-finding processes as well as the
substantive law of the case, whether the factfinder is a jury or a
judge.6
clinical law professor, author, expert in subject; Mary Murguia, Deputy Chief,
Criminal Division, supervises violent crimes section, experience with sexual
assault and domestic violence cases on Indian reservations; Susan Osthoff,
Director, National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, Planning
Committee member; Janet Parrish, Esq., National Clearinghouse for the De-
fense of Battered Women, legal researcher, author of Trend Analysis; Beth
Richie, Ph.D., professor of sociology, author on race, gender and crime; Mark
Schlakman, Esq., Special Counsel to Florida Governor Lawton Chiles, counsel
to Florida clemency panels; Donald Wolff, Esq., criminal defense attorney,
Family Violence Project, National Council of Juvenile & Family Court Judges.
5. These colleagues prefer to remain anonymous.
6. The parameters of the fact-finding process have already been established in
Maryland. Banks v. Maryland, 92 Md. App. 422, 608 A.2d 1249 (1992); see
Jeanne-Marie Bates, Comment, Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman
Syndrome in Maryland, 50 MD. L. REv. 920 (1991); Maryland Criminal Pattern
Jury Instructions, 4:17.2 (Michie 1991); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 10-916 (Supp. 1994). Section 10-916 provides:
(a) Definitions. - (1) In this section the following words have the
meanings indicated.
(2) "Battered Spouse Syndrome" means the psychological condi-
tion of a victim of repeated physical and psychological abuse by a
spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, or former cohabitant which is also
recognized in the medical and scientific community as the "Battered
Woman's Syndrome."
(3) "Defendant" means an individual charged with:
(i) First degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter,
maiming, or attempt to commit any of these crimes; or
Baltimore Law Review
Finally, my opinions have been influenced by my observations
of judges' and jurors' reactions to expert testimony in other kinds
of cases and on other issues that are, in many instances, seemingly
unrelated to those under scrutiny here. During my nine years on the
bench, which were preceded by ten years as a litigator and two years
as a judge's clerk, I have observed expert testimony and factfinders'
reactions to it in hundreds of cases, including domestic, personal
injury and criminal cases. I believe that these experiences have shaped
my opinion on the issues addressed in this paper. Therefore, I believe
that I would be remiss if I did not put these experiences before any
reader as a possible source of bias to consider when evaluating the
propositions set forth below.
III. EXPERIENCE
The two cases that I presided over in which an abused woman
was accused of killing her abuser, under such circumstances that she
was prosecuted for first degree murder and all lesser included degrees
of homicide, resulted in very different dispositions. In each case, my
rulings on evidentiary and procedural issues were the same. Those
rulings reflected my belief, which was later codified in Maryland,
(ii) Assault with intent to murder or maim.(b) Admissibility of evidence. -Notwithstanding evidence that the
defendant was the first aggressor, used excessive force, or failed to
retreat at the time of the alleged offense, when the defendant raises
the issue that the defendant was, at the time of the alleged offense,
suffering from the Battered Spouse Syndrome as a result of the past
course of conduct of the individual who is the victim of the crime
for which the defendant has been charged, the court may admit for
the purpose of explaining the defendant's motive or state of mind, or
both, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense:
(1) Evidence of repeated physical and psychological abuse of the
defendant perpetrated by an individual who is the victim of a crime
for which the defendant has been charged; and
(2) Expert testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome. (1991, ch.
337).
I must say, with admiration, that this research has also been done nationally,
in a more thorough and comprehensive manner than I would attempt here, by
other Roundtable participants. For an especially helpful discussion, see Janet
Parish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in
Criminal Cases, National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women,
(Nov. 1994); see also Holly Maguigan, A Defense on Battered Women Charged
with Homicide: The Expert's Role During Preparation for and Conduct of
Trials, (Working Paper, Apr. 1995); Robert F. Schopp, Barbara J. Sturgis &
Megan Sullivan, Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Dis-
tinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994.1 U. ILL. L. Rv. 45 (1994).
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that
the court may admit for the purpose of explaining the
defendant's motive or state of mind, or both, at the time
of the commission of the alleged offense:
(1) Evidence of repeated physical and psychological
abuse of the defendant perpetrated by an indi-
vidual who is the victim of a crime for which
the defendant has been charged, and
(2) Expert testimony on the Battered Spouse Syn-
drome. 7
A. The First Case-Defendant A
The first case that I shall discuss in which the defense of
"Battered Spouse Syndrome" was utilized was tried in the fall of
1990, prior to the passage of the statute mandating the admission of
expert testimony and evidence of the history of abuse. In this case,
the defendant was acquitted by a jury. The verdict was reached after
the jury had heard the testimony of the defendant and others about
the defendant's physical and psychological abuse by her deceased co-
habitant over an extended period of time. The jury also heard a
psychologist testify as to the psychological effects of the abuse
inflicted on the defendant. All of this evidence was admitted over
the objection of the prosecutor, whose position was that this evidence
was irrelevant in the absence of a statute declaring its relevance and
mandating its admission. There was, depending on whose testimony
one believed, anywhere from a ten-minute to no-minute interlude
between the last act of physical abuse by the deceased abuser and
the defendant's homocidal act. I do not specifically recall the gender
breakdown of the jury, but I do recall that it was mixed.
More importantly, there was very little dispute of fact except as
to the length of the brief time interval between the last instance of
abuse and the stabbing of the abuser by the defendant. The defen-
dant's theory was that her actions were in self-defense. This was
supported by her testimony that the deceased, "on the attack,"
looked for her in their home for the purpose of inflicting further
beatings upon her. It was under these stressful circumstances, the
defendant testified, that she stabbed the victim to keep him from
beating her. The defense expert simply explained how the defendant's
actions were "reasonable" under these circumstances, although that
term was obviously neither intended nor understood as a clinical or
legal term.
The State offered no alternative to the defendant's own expla-
nation of her motive for her actions. The State, after the presentation
7. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916 (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
19951
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of its case in chief, chose not to prosecute the first degree premed-
itated murder charge. Instead, the State's theory was that what had
occurred was second degree murder because the defendant's version
of what occurred, particularly the time sequence, was not credible.
The prosecution's theory was, very simply, that the jury should not
believe that the defendant was defending herself or even that she
could reasonably think that she was defending herself under the
circumstances of the case. For that reason the State posited that,
even conceding the history of abuse of the defendant by her deceased
victim, there was no legal justification or even mitigation for her
homicidal act.
This put the prosecution in the untenable position of, in effect,
advocating that the jury reject the defense expert's logical explanation
of what had occurred in the case without being provided with any
alternative theory that could coherently replace it. The unsteady
course of the State's argument resulted in the following dilemma for
the jurors: In order to accept the prosecution's theory of the case,
the jurors would have been required to work harder intellectually
than if they had simply accepted both the defendant's version of
what had occurred and her expert witness's explanation of why her
actions in stabbing her abuser were reasonable under the circum-
stances.
The jurors in this case chose the less intellectually rigorous
course. They accepted the abused woman's version of what occurred
and her expert's explanation of why her conduct was reasonable.
The jurors avoided the more intellectually taxing path of trying to
determine for themselves the facts and the reasonableness of the
defendant's actions.
B. The Second Case-Defendant B
The opposite result was reached in the second case, which was
tried in 1993 before a jury of eleven women and one man. The jury
was selected after numerous, mostly unsuccessful, Batson8 challenges
by the prosecutor, who challenged the defense tactic of striking male
jurors simply because they were male. The largely female jury con-
victed the abused woman defendant of second degree murder.
In both the first case and this case, there had been a long history
of physical and sexual abuse of each of the abused women defendants
8. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the government's privilege
to exercise peremptory challenges is subject to the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution); Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that the defendant's privilege to exercise
peremptory challenges is subject to the Equal Protection Clause); Tyler v.
State, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993) (adopting Batson and its progeny to
prohibit peremptory challenges based on gender).
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by the individuals that they killed. These histories were admitted into
evidence in both cases and were not seriously disputed in either case.
In both cases, there was also expert testimony that the defendants
were suffering from the effects of abuse at the time they killed their
respective abusers. 9 In both cases, the jury was instructed in exactly
the same manner:
You have heard evidence of repeated physical and psy-
chological abuse of the [d]efendant, (name of defendant),
by the alleged victim in this case, (name of deceased). You
also heard evidence, expert evidence, testimony on the sub-
ject of the Battered Spouse Syndrome.
You may consider this evidence for the purpose of ex-
plaining the [d]efendant's motive, or state of mind, or both
at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. Bat-
tered spouse syndrome means the psychological condition
of a victim of repeated physical and psychological abuse by
a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant or former co-habitant
which is also recognized in the medical and scientific com-
munity as the "Battered Women's Syndrome."' 0
The defendant is charged with the crime of murder. This
charge in this case includes second degree murder and
voluntary manslaughter.
Second degree murder is the killing of another person,
without legal justification or mitigation, and with either the
intent to kill or the intent to inflict such serious bodily harm
that death would be the likely result. Second degree murder
does not require premeditation or deliberation. In order to
convict the defendant of second degree murder, the State
9. Section 10-916 uses the word "Syndrome," which arguably limits the admission
of expert testimony to defining that term as it applies to the condition of a
particular defendant in a particular case. However, in a preceding section
entitled "Definitions," the statute defines the term very broadly. In fact, the
statute reduces the significance and, therefore, the limiting effect of the later
statutory language by rather pointedly avoiding a clinical definition of "Syn-
drome," i.e., as a disease, mental illness or even mental defect. Rather, it is
defined as a "psychological condition of a victim" caused by a "spouse, former
spouse, cohabitant or former cohabitant."
Interestingly, the statute, therefore, defines the defendant as a "victim"
whose condition as a victim can be statutorily attributed to any one of a
number of potential targets of her crime. The significance of the term "Battered
Woman Syndrome" is further minimized by the statute's reference to it as a
term utilized in the "medical and scientific community" to describe this
condition.
10. The first two paragraphs of these jury instructions were written by me but
were drafted to track the language of Maryland's "Battered Spouse Syndrome"
statute. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916 (Supp. 1994).
1"51
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must prove:
(1) that the conduct of the defendant caused the death
of (victim);
(2) that the defendant engaged in the deadly conduct
either with the intent to kill or with the intent to inflict
such serious bodily harm that death would be the likely
result;
(3) that the killing was not justified; and
(4) that there were no mitigating circumstances.
Voluntary manslaughter is a killing that would otherwise
be murder, but with the presence of a mitigating circum-
stance. A mitigating circumstance is not a complete defense
that results in a verdict of not guilty, but is a partial defense
that reduces the level of guilt from murder to manslaughter.
You have heard evidence that the defendant killed (victim)
in self-defense. You must decide whether self-defense is a
complete defense, a partial defense or no defense in this
case.
In order to convict the defendant of murder, the State
must prove that the defendant did not act in a complete or
partial self-defense. Otherwise, a complete self-defense re-
quires a verdict of not guilty, while a partial self-defense
will result in a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter
and not guilty of murder.
Self-defense is a complete defense and you are required
to find the defendant not guilty if all of the following four
factors are present:
(1) the defendant was not the aggressor and did not raise
the fight to the deadly force level;
(2) the defendant actually believed that [she] was in
immediate and imminent danger of death or serious bodily
harm;
(3) the defendant's belief was reasonable; and
(4) the defendant used no more force than was reason-
ably necessary to defend [herself] in light of the threatened
or actual force.
In order to convict the defendant of murder, the State
must prove that self-defense does not apply in this case.
This means that you are required to find the defendant not
guilty unless the state has persuaded you, beyond a reason-
able doubt, that at least one of the four factors of self-
defense was absent.
Even if you find that the defendant did not act in what
has been defined as complete self-defense, the defendant
may still have acted in partial self-defense. A partial self-
defense is a mitigating circumstance. The difference between
[Vol. 25
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voluntary manslaughter and murder is the presence or ab-
sence of a mitigating circumstance. The presence of a mit-
igating circumstance will not relieve the defendant of guilt,
but it will result in a verdict of voluntary manslaughter
rather than murder.
If the defendant actually believed that she was in imme-
diate and imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm,
even though a reasonable person would not have so believed,
the defendant's actual, though unreasonable, belief is a
partial self-defense and results in a verdict of voluntary
manslaughter rather than murder. If the defendant used
greater force than a reasonable person would have used,
but the defendant actually believed that the force used was
necessary, the defendant's actual, though unreasonable, be-
lief is a partial self-defense and results in a verdict of
voluntary manslaughter rather than murder.
In order to convict the defendant of murder, the State
must prove that the defendant did not act in a complete or
partial self-defense. Otherwise, a complete self-defense re-
quires a verdict of not guilty, while a partial self-defense
will result in a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter
and not guilty of murder."
The major difference between the two cases was that in the
second case, where the defendant was convicted, the prosecution
presented a more credible alternative theory to the defendant's version
of the pertinent events than in the first case, in which the defendant
was aquitted. In the second case, the eleven female jurors and one
male juror seemed not to believe that the defendant killed her abuser
because she continued to fear for her life during the three hour
interim that passed after his last physically abusive contact with her.
The prosecution reinforced the portrait of the decedent abuser as a
truly reprehensible human being through the use of State's witnesses,
clever cross-examination of defense witnesses and the testimony of
the defendant herself. The prosecutor then added a further dimension
of evil to the courtroom portrait of the deceased abuser by painting
him as a compulsive womanizer who constantly taunted and angered
his abused wife with tales of his sexual exploits with other women,
even while he was sexually and physically abusing her.
The prosecution then invoked the age-old stereotype of the
"jealous wife," going so far as to suggest, during closing arguments
to the jury, that the jurors remember in their deliberations that
11. The paragraphs that follow the first two paragraphs were adapted from
Maryland Institute for Continuing Professional Education of Lawyers, Inc.,
Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions, 4:17.2, 227-29 (Michie 1991).
1995]
"[h]ell hath no fury like a woman scorned." The prosecution further
suggested that the jury consider the evidence that supported the
stereotype to explain why the defendant killed her husband while he
sat in a chair watching television some three hours after he last
abused her.
The jury, by convicting the defendant of second degree murder
in the second case, obviously rejected her version of what had
occurred, her description of her fear of death or serious bodily harm
at the time she stabbed her husband and her expert psychologist's
explanation of why that fear was both real and reasonable. Instead,
the jury apparently found it easier and more satisfying, both intel-
lectually and emotionally, to accept the prosecution's soap opera/
"Murder She Wrote"/"Columbo" type theory of the case.
I am convinced that the conviction of defendant B for second
degree murder, as distinguished from the acquittal of the similarly
abused defendant A tried before me two years earlier, was caused
by the factors listed below.' 2
First, in defendant B's case, the evidence established that there
was a one to three hour interlude between the last instance of physical
or sexual abuse of the defendant by her deceased abuser. By contrast,
in defendant A's case, the relevant interlude was, at most, only ten
minutes. The experts in both cases omitted a direct discussion of the
effect that the battering of the respective defendant would have had
on her state of mind or fear of her abuser within the relevant time
frame.
In defendant A's case, given the resulting acquittal, the time
lapse was neither critical nor controlling, and such expert testimony
was, therefore, not needed. In defendant B's case, however, the jury
was left to its own devices to fill the void created by the lack of
expert testimony. With no testimony as to why defendant B would
12. The following are a few of my general insights regarding jurors: Jurors will
usually adopt the theory of the case that seems to them most consistent with
their own personal experience. If they have no common frame of reference in
their own personal experience, they will rely on what they observe on television
or in movies about how similar situations play out. Jurors will generally choose
case theories that are easy to understand over theories that are more cumber-
some to piece together. Jurors welcome the suggested theories of attorneys if
they make sense and do not require a vast amount of intellectual handiwork
to implement.
Likewise, the credibility given by jurors to lawyers and to witnesses, partic-
ularly expert witnesses, is very much affected by the manner in which they
address jurors. Jurors tend to be more receptive when lawyers and witnesses
demonstrate their knowledge and avoid "talking down" to jurors, thereby
showing them proper respect. The credibility accredited to a witness, expert or
attorney varies directly with the empathy the individual establishes with the
jury.
[Vol. 25Baltimore Law Review
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kill her abuser hours after he had ceased any physical contact with
her, the jury apparently fell back on female stereotypes and television
scenarios to explain defendant B's actions. This was fatal to the
defense.
Second, in neither case did the expert testimony deal with
misconceptions of the term "Battered Woman Syndrome" or any
other general stereotypes about women that might be invoked to
explain the abused women's actions. Again, this was obviously not
critical to defendant A's case, which resulted in her acquittal, because
no misconceptions were proffered by the prosecution or even sug-
gested to the jury as an explanation for the defendant's actions.
However, in defendant B's case, myths and misconceptions were
critical. The defense failed to put these myths and other misconcep-
tions to rest through the use of expert testimony. The defense's
failure to encourage the jurors to make an informed rejection of
such misconceptions and stereotypes made it much easier to convict
the defendant of murder than it would have been if such a rejection
were accomplished through the use of expert testimony.
Third, the amount of emphasis placed on the jury's gender
composition influenced the outcome of each case. In the first case,
both the customary illegal racial and gender stereotyping and other,
legally permissible, stereotyping by both the prosecutor and the
defense counsel took place in the jury selection process, but the
defense neither had as its goal, nor did it get, an all female jury. In
the second case, however, it was obvious that the defense attorney
was attempting to have as many women placed on the jury as
possible. In fact, he succeeded beyond even his expectations in that
he obtained, although not without a fight, an almost all female jury.
In making gender his paramount priority, however, the defense
counsel lost a number of opportunities to have perhaps more sym-
pathetic jurors. A number of younger and/or more educated jurors
were lost, including some whose professions (if one is willing to
invoke further stereotypes) would arguably have indicated their greater
potential, as a result of their own broader education and experience,
to understand the defendant's experience and point of view. Perhaps
most importantly, the rejected jurors might have been more receptive
to expert testimony that would have explained the abused woman's
actions in terms more complex than a television mystery show.
The fourth factor is the manner in which the counsel in each
case managed to relate prior battering to the defendants' fear and
subsequent actions in the cases at bar. In defendant A's case, the
expert psychologist first testified that the defendant was suffering
from "Battered Woman Syndrome" and then explained how the
effects of battering affected her state of mind at the time of the
incident. The thrust of the expert testimony was that, in light of her
condition and the specific circumstances of the case at the time of
19951
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her stabbing, her belief that she was in danger of death or serious
bodily harm was real and reasonable.
In defendant B's case, which resulted in conviction, there was
extensive testimony indicating that the defendant suffered from "Bat-
tered Spouse Syndrome" at the time of the stabbing, but there was
no attempt to relate the effects of her prior battering to her actions.
There was no attempt by defense counsel, through his expert's
testimony, to explain how this condition could cause a defendant to
reasonably fear that she was in danger of death or serious bodily
harm from an abuser who was sitting in a chair and watching
television for three hours prior to his stabbing. For that reason, and
because defense counsel's requested jury instruction did not accurately
state the law of Maryland, 3 I refused to instruct the jury as follows:
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was not suffering from the Bat-
tered Woman Syndrome at the time of the killing and that
the death was not connected to the Battered Woman Syn-
drome.
As grounds for refusing to give the aforementioned jury instruction,
I stated, on the record:
I do not believe, so the record is clear, and I think this
is where we disagree, that the legislature, by that statute,
has set up the Battered Spouse Syndrome as an absolute
defense, or even partial self-defense. They have, rather, said
that it can be considered in conjunction with both of those
[absolute or partial self-defense], and that's what I've told
them. 14
My decision in defendant B's case was affirmed by the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland.' 5 Because I refused to give the
proposed jury instruction, the defense could not argue the principal
tenet of its defense to the jury. The testimony of the expert was,
therefore, placed in a legal context where it appeared to be offered
to excuse the defendant's homicidal act rather than to explain it.
The result was a conviction of the most serious homicide charge
available to the jury-second degree murder.
13. See supra note 7.
14. In fact, defendant B offered expert testimony that his condition was far more
serious than that of defendant A. Specifically, defendant A's expert psychologist
testified that defendant A suffered from moderate depression and post traumatic
stress disorder. In defendant B's case, the expert psychologist testified that
defendant B suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome, depression, dysthymia
(a chronic mild to moderate depression), post traumatic stress disorder and
dependent personality disorder at the time of her homocidal act.
15. Unreported Opinion No. 93-1705, filed Aug. 2, 1994.
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FROM THE BENCH
From my experience in the two trials described above, I have
reached the following conclusions: Expert testimony on the "effects
of battering" in cases where a woman is charged with murdering her
abuser should encompass the broadest possible, intellectually honest
definition of the experience of what it is to be a "battered woman,"
as well as a "batterer." It should also articulate what that total
experience and relationship does to change the nature of the social
conduct, contact and expectations between the battered woman and
her batterer. The expert testimony should then, if possible, place into
the context of that experience and relationship the legal terms that
the judge will use to instruct the jury as to how to apply the law to
the facts of the case. The terms that the expert should incorporate
include, but are not limited to, the following: "aggressor," "reason-
able belief of immediate or imminent danger of death or serious
bodily harm," and "necessary force" or "undue force."
The information described above should then be reinforced by
either the expert, in his testimony, the counsel in closing arguments,
or both and should be related specifically to the facts of the case on
trial, using the same terminology that the judge will use in his
instructions to the jury.
Furthermore, the testimony of an expert in a case where the
battered woman is accused of killing or initiating a violent attack on
her abuser should include an element of "debunking" myths and
misconceptions about the term "Battered Woman Syndrome" and/
or women in general, particularly if the prosecution or defense is
presenting such a misconception as a part of its theory of the case.
Additionally, the substance of the testimony of either the pro-
secution's or the defense's expert concerning the effects that battering
has on an abused woman should be disclosed and discussed as part
of the plea negotiation process so that a just disposition can be
discussed in good faith prior to trial.
Finally, defense counsel should check the jurisdiction in which
the battered woman will be tried to see if any judges in that
jurisdiction have recently received multi-disciplinary judicial educa-
tion on the issues associated with such cases. Defense cousel should
attempt to ascertain whether the particular presiding judge would, in
the opinion of members of the local bar who know him, be likely
to absorb such multi-disciplinary education and to apply it in the
case. If the answer is in the affirmative, serious consideration should
be given to waiving trial by jury and electing a court trial.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Commentary, I have attempted to put forth a trial judge's
perspective and observations. It is my hope that practitioners will
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find it useful to reflect upon my descriptions of these two scenarios:
one in which expert testimony was effectively utilized to secure the
acquittal of the defendant and one in which expert testimony was
not so utilized. For the benefit of practitioners, I have suggested
several ways to maximize the value of such expert testimony in cases
in which the accused is a battered woman facing potential murder
charges. In essence, I would suggest to every practitioner trying such
cases that the most important use of expert testimony is to ensure
that the jury, in reaching a fair verdict, can make truly informed
decisions about what it has heard at trial without relying on television
antics about the "drama" of the courtroom.
